INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUS AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION IN THE EU AND THE USPDF|Epub|txt|kindle电子书版本下载

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUS AND CUMULATIVE INNOVATION IN THE EU AND THE USPDF格式电子书版下载

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1.Introduction1

1.1.The Previous Focus On Initial Innovation1

1.2.The Need to Account for Follow-On Innovation4

1.3.The Regulatory Problem and the Policy Levers5

1.4.Methodology and Structure6

2.The Relationship between IP and Antitrust Laws8

2.1.A First Look: Two Types of IP9

2.1.1.A Common Dynamic Benefit: Incentives to Create Markets10

2.1.2.Similar Static Costs: Preventing Competition by Imitation12

2.1.3.A Different Dynamic Cost: Blocking Follow-On Innovation and Improvements13

2.2.A Closer Look: The Anti-Competitive Potential of IP Rights14

2.2.1.IP Laws and the Basic Rights of IP Holders14

2.2.2.The Anti-Competitive Potential of Conduct Involving IP19

2.3.Approaches to the Relationship between IP and Antitrust24

2.3.1.Approach Ⅰ: Absolute IP Domination25

2.3.2.Approach Ⅱ: Inherency and the Specific Subject Matter as Legal(istic) Filters26

2.3.3.Approach Ⅲ: Balancing Different Means to Enhance Consumer Welfare32

2.4.A Positive Economic Analysis of the IP/Antitrust Interface46

2.4.1.Preventing Competition by Imitation (Reward Mechanism)47

2.4.2.Other Functions of IP and their Relation to Antitrust58

2.5.IP or Antitrust? Some Meta Rules60

2.5.1.Approach Ⅰ: ‘Pure' IP Solution60

2.5.2.Approach Ⅱ: Antitrust as a Discretionary ‘Fine-Tuning' Device61

2.5.3.Approach Ⅲ: Comparative Cost-Benefit Analysis According to the Competition Problem63

2.6.Which Antitrust Rules? Some Principles65

2.7.Conclusion67

3.The Concepts of Monopolisation and Abuse: What is the Correct Test?68

3.1.The Tests Used under § 2 Sherman Act and Article 102 TFEU70

3.2.Obstacles to Cross-Fertilisation?72

3.2.1.Exploitative Abuses73

3.2.2.The Elements of § 2 Sherman Act and Article 102 TFEU74

3.2.3.Leveraging75

3.2.4.What is to be Protected? Market Structure vs Consumers76

3.2.5.Enforcement79

3.3.Analysis of Potential Standards79

3.3.1.The Relationship between the Standard and Conduct-Specific Rules80

3.3.2.The Cost-Error Approach as Heuristic81

3.3.3.The Conduct Element—Suggested Standards85

3.4.Conclusion95

4.Refusals to Deal which May Impede Follow-On Innovation96

4.1.The Traditional Typology of Refusals to Deal98

4.1.1.Vertical Complementary and Horizontal Refusals to Deal98

4.1.2.Concerted Refusals to Deal102

4.1.3.‘Naked' vs ‘Constructive' and Conditional vs Unconditional Refusals102

4.1.4.Discriminatory Conditions of Supply103

4.1.5.Termination of Supply105

4.1.6.Refusal to Deal as an Instrument or as a Corollary of Other Anti-Competitive Conduct106

4.2.Cumulative Innovation and Bargaining Rules109

4.2.1.Repercussions of Mandatory Rules on the Incentive to Innovate111

4.2.2.Cases for IP Reform: Patent Thickets, Holdup, and Royalty Stacking112

4.2.3.Self-Correction of Innovation Regimes?114

4.3.A Typology of Refusals to Deal involving IP115

4.4.Scenario 1: Impeding Research into Follow-On Innovation116

4.4.1.IP Solutions116

4.4.2.Antitrust in Innovation Markets?117

4.5.Scenario 2: Impeding the Marketing of Follow-On Innovation119

4.5.1.The Potential Case for Antitrust: Foreclosure of Competition by Improved Products120

4.5.2.Some Conditions of an Antitrust Rule121

4.5.3.Comparison to Alternative IP Solutions122

4.5.4.Which Antitrust Solution: Leveraging Test or Essential Facilities Rule?124

4.6.Scenario 3: Refusal to Give Interoperability Information125

4.6.1.Gatekeepers on Markets with Network Effects127

4.6.2.Protection through Trade Secrecy131

4.7.Scenario 4: Refusal to License IP which Protects a Standard132

4.8.Scenario 5: Refusal to Supply Products on the Basis of IP133

4.9.Conclusion135

5.The Licensing Fee: Determining Liability and the Remedy136

5.1.The Royalty138

5.1.1.No Royalty138

5.1.2.Cost-Based Pricing139

5.1.3.Same Firm Price Comparison, Market-Based Pricing, and Profit Comparison140

5.1.4.Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR)141

5.1.5.Hypothetical Bargaining and Maximum Willingness to Pay142

5.1.6.At-Least Reasonably Efficient Licensee's Maximum Ability to Pay143

5.2.The Relationship between Liability and the Remedy Price145

5.3.Non-Discriminatory Pricing?146

5.4.The Procedure: Bargaining, Determining the Price, Monitoring, and Enforcement147

5.5.Conclusion147

6.An Essential Facilities Test149

6.1.Condition 1: Harm to Competition150

6.1.1.Dominant Position150

6.1.2.No Circumvention or Substitution within a Reasonable Period of Time157

6.1.3.Elimination or Prevention of Effective Competition on the Adjacent Market158

6.2.Condition 2: No Ex Ante Investment Defence160

6.2.1.The Difficulties of Balancing in Innovation Cases160

6.2.2.Ex Ante Investment162

6.3.Condition 3: No Ex Post Efficiency Defence163

6.4.Conclusion163

7.Cumulative Innovation under US IP and Antitrust Laws165

7.1.The Initial Innovator's and the Improver's Positions under US IP Laws165

7.1.1.US Patent Law166

7.1.2.US Copyright Law172

7.1.3.US Trade Secret Law175

7.2.The General ‘No Duty to Deal' Rule under US Antitrust Law176

7.2.1.No General Duties to Use and License IP Even Pre- Trinko176

7.2.2.The Effects of Trinko180

7.3.Potential Exceptions to the No Duty to Deal Rule181

7.3.1.Essential Facilities Doctrine182

7.3.2.Unjustified Change in the Pattern of Dealing187

7.3.3.Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine189

7.3.4.Margin Squeeze193

7.3.5.Discriminatory Refusals to Deal194

7.3.6.Concerted Refusals to Deal195

7.4.The Remedy196

7.4.1.Example 1: Kodak Ⅱ196

7.4.2.Example 2: Microsoft197

7.4.3.Example 3: Rambus199

7.5.Future Tendencies201

7.6.Conclusion203

8.Cumulative Innovation under European IP Laws and EU Competition Law205

8.1.The Original Innovator's and the Improver's Positions under National IP Laws in the EU206

8.1.1.German Patent Law206

8.1.2.German Copyright and Unfair Competition Law212

8.1.3.German Trade Secret Protection and Conclusion217

8.2.Limits to Refusals to Supply Based on IP under Article 102 TFEU217

8.2.1.Essential Facilities Test219

8.2.2.Margin Squeeze235

8.2.3.Refusal to Deal as a Complementary Strategy238

8.2.4.Discriminatory Refusal to Deal Based on IP240

8.3.The Remedy242

8.3.1.Substantive Criteria244

8.3.2.Procedure247

8.4.Future Tendencies and Conclusion247

9.Comparison and International Dimension249

9.1.Differences between the US and EU Approaches249

9.2.Potential Explanations for the Differences251

9.2.1.Constitutional Frameworks251

9.2.2.Beliefs252

9.2.3.Interests253

9.3.The International Antitrust Law of IP254

9.3.1.The Current TRIPS Approach255

9.3.2.Is Stronger Harmonisation of the Antitrust Law of IP Needed?258

10.Summary260

10.1.IP and Antitrust as the Framework for Cumulative Innovation260

10.2.The Relationship between IP and Antitrust Laws260

10.3.Monopolisation and Abuse: What is the Correct Test?261

10.4.Refusals to Deal which May Impede Follow-On Innovation261

10.5.The Licensing Fee: Determining Liability and the Remedy261

10.6.An Essential Facilities Test262

10.7.Cumulative Innovation under US IP and Antitrust Laws262

10.8.Cumulative Innovation under European IP Laws and EU Competition Law262

10.9.Comparison and International Dimension263

Bibliography264

Index293