The handbook of experimental economicsPDF|Epub|txt|kindle电子书版本下载

The handbook of experimental economicsPDF格式电子书版下载

注意：本站所有压缩包均有解压码： 点击下载压缩包解压工具

1.Introduction to Experimental Economics&Alvin E.Roth3

Ⅰ.A Brief History of Experimental Economics4

A.Early Experiments：1930-19605

B.The 1960s to the Present19

Ⅱ.The Uses of Experimentation21

Ⅲ.Some Series of Experiments23

A.Prisoners’ Dilemmas and Public Goods26

B.Coordination35

C.Bargaining Behavior40

D.Market Organization and Competitive Equilibrium49

E.Auction Markets and Disequilibrium Behavior60

F.Individual Choice Behavior67

Notes86

Bibliography98

2.Public Goods：A Survey of Experimental Research&John O.Ledyard111

Ⅰ.Introduction111

A.A Simple Public Goods Experiment112

B.The Art of Experiment：Sensitivity and Control113

C.The Language of Experiment：Mechanisms and Environments115

D.The Range of Public Goods Environments118

E.What Is and Is Not to Be Surveyed119

Ⅱ.Are People Selfish or Cooperative？121

A.Bohm：Estimating Demand122

B.Dawes et al：Social Dilemmas126

C.Marwell et al.：The Free-Rider Problem130

D.Economists Begin to React134

E.Isaac et al.：Systematic Study by Economists137

Ⅲ.What Improves Cooperation？141

A.Thresholds and Provision Points144

B.Experience，Repetition，and Learning146

C.Strong Effects149

D.Weak Effects158

E.Unknown Effects167

Ⅳ.Final Thoughts169

Appendix174

Notes175

Bibliography181

3.Coordination Problems&Jack Ochs195

Introduction195

Ⅰ.Experiments Using Overlapping Generations Environments197

A.Adaptive Learning Processes and Rational Expectations Equilibria197

B.The Path of Prices When the Rate of Growth of the Money Stock Is Zero199

C.Price Inflation with a Growing Money Stock201

D.Sunspots205

Ⅱ.Coordination Games with Pareto Ranked Equilibria209

A.Payoff Dominance，Security and Historical Precedent209

B.The Relevance of Dominated Strategies218

C.Influencing Equilibrium Selection222

Ⅲ.Experiments in Decentralized Matching Environments：Games with Multiple Optimal Equilibria233

Ⅳ.Concluding Remarks244

Notes246

Bibliography249

4.Bargaining Experiments&Alvin E.Roth253

Ⅰ.Agreements254

A.Unstructured Bargaining Experiments255

B.Sequential Bargaining Experiments256

Ⅱ.Disagreements and Delays292

A.The Frequency of Disagreements and Delays292

B.Anonymous versus Face-to-Face Bargaining294

C.Tests of Hypotheses about the Causes of Disagreements and Costly Delays304

D.Deadlines323

Ⅲ.Concluding Remarks327

Notes331

Bibliography342

5.Industrial Organization：A Survey of Laboratory Research&Charles A.Holt349

Ⅰ.Overview349

Ⅱ.Beginnings350

Ⅲ.The Relevance of Experiments to the Study of IO352

A.Experiments That Evaluate Behavioral Assumptions352

B.Tests for Sensitivity to Violations of Structural Assumptions354

C.Searching for Empirical Regularities354

Ⅳ.Design and Procedural Issues355

A.Instructions355

B.Design Considerations358

Ⅴ.Trading Institutions360

A.Posted Prices361

B.Uniform Prices365

C.One-Sided Sequential Auctions367

D.Double Auctions368

E.Decentralized Negotiations373

F.Discounting373

G.Other Institutions374

H.Disadvantages of the Cournot Quantity-Choice Institution375

Ⅵ.Monopoly Regulation and Potential Entry377

A.Monopoly377

B.Decentralized Regulatory Proposals382

C.Potential Competition as a Regulator：Market Contestability383

D.Predatory Pricing and Antitrust Remedies387

Ⅶ.Market Structure and Market Power391

A.Definitions of Market Power392

B.Market Power in Double Auctions393

C.Market Power in Posted-Offer Auctions396

Ⅷ.Plus Factors That Facilitate Collusion398

A.Repetition with Different Cohorts：Experience401

B.Multiperiod Repetition with the Same Cohort403

C.Pure-Numbers Effects and the Ability to Punish406

D.Communication409

E.Contractual Provisions411

Ⅸ.Product Differentiation and Multiple Markets416

A.Product Quality，Asymmetric Information，and Market Failures417

B.Spatial Competition419

C.Veerically Related Markets420

Ⅹ.Conclusion421

Notes425

Bibliography435

6.Experimental Asset Markets：A Survey&Shyam Sunder445

Ⅰ.Informational Efficiency of Markets446

A.Field Data from Financial Markets447

B.Designing Experimental Asset Markets447

C.Dissemination of Information450

D.Aggregation of Information456

E.Market for Information461

Ⅱ.Futures and State-Contingent Claims464

Ⅲ.Bubbles and False Equilibria467

Ⅳ.Learning and Dynamics475

A.Adjustment Path475

B.Variables That Transmit Information475

C.Learning Sequences477

D.Aggregate Uncertainty479

E.Role of Arbitrage479

F.Generation of Bids and Asks480

Ⅴ.Econometric Comparisons of Field and Laboratory Data481

A.Variance Bound Tests481

B.Arbitrage Relationships482

Ⅵ.Investment and Public Policy484

A.Trading Suspensions and Price Change Limits484

B.Double Auction versus Call Market485

C.Specialist Privileges and Book Display486

D.Control of Speculative Bubbles486

E.Bid-Ask Spread490

F.Off-Floor and Block Trading490

Ⅶ.Laboratory Modeling of Asset Markets491

Ⅷ.Concluding Remarks493

Notes494

Bibliography495

7.Auctions：A Survey of Experimental Research&John H.Kagel501

Introduction501

Ⅰ.The Symmetric Independent Private-Values Model503

A.Experimental Procedures504

B.Tests of the Revenue-Equivalence Theorem505

C.Effects of Varying and Uncertain Numbers of Bidders514

D.Auctions with Affiliated Private Values517

E.Effects of Price Information in Private Value Auctions520

F.Learning，Adjustment Processes，and Cash Balance Effects in First-Price Private Value Auctions521

G.Risk Aversion，CRRA，the Flat Maximum Critique，and the Binary Lottery Procedure for Controlling Risk Preferences523

Ⅱ.Common Value Auctions536

A.The Winner’s Curse in Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions537

B.More Winner’s Curse：English Auctions and First-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Information547

C.The Winner’s Curse in Other Market Settings550

D.Learning and Adjustment Processes in Markets with a Winner’s Curse557

Ⅲ.Additional Topics560

A.Collusion560

B.Comparing Results from Field Studies with Experiments564

C.Two-Sided Auctions569

D.Other Auction Studies572

Ⅳ.Conclusions572

Notes573

Bibliography580

8.Individual Decision Making&Colin Camerer587

Ⅰ.Introduction587

A.Limited Rationality and Decision Research588

B.Two Controversies：Methods and Implications588

C.A Map and Guidebook589

Ⅱ.Judgment590

A.Calibration590

B.Perception and Memory Biases595

C.Bayesian Updating and Representativeness596

D.Confirmation Bias and Obstacles to Learning608

E.Expectations Formation609

F.Iterated Expectations and the Curse of Knowledge612

G.The Illusion of Control615

H.Judgment：Summary and New Directions616

Ⅲ.Choice under Risk and Uncertainty617

A.Expected Utility617

B.Some History and Early Evidence619

C.Mounting Evidence of EU Violation （1965-1986）622

D.Generalizations of Expected Utility and Recent Tests626

E.Subjective Expected Utility644

F.Choice over Time649

G.Process Theories and Tests651

H.Description Invariance652

I.Procedure Invariance657

J.Endowment Effects and Buying-Selling Price Gaps665

K.Search670

L.Choice：Summary and New Directions673

Ⅳ. Conclusions and Research Directions674

Notes676

Bibliography683

Author Index705

Subject Index715